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Character and Credit 
Roger Bernhardt 
The Future of Tenant Screening 
I am reluctant to get too worked up in dealing with the two tenant screening decisions that are 
reported in this issue, since it seems inevitable that he players will devise responses to them to 
retilt the playing field sufficiently as to render obsolete most of what I have to say. 
The cases are Trujillo v First Am. Registry, Inc. (2007) 157 CA4th 628, 68 CR3d 732, and 
Ortiz v Lyon Mgmt. Group, Inc. (2007) 157 CA4th 604, 69 CR3d 66, reported at p 25 and p 24, 
respectively, both decided by Division Three of theFourth Appellate District on December 3, 
2007. Both were actions by tenants against credit reporting agencies based on the tenant 
screening reports they had issued; in both cases, th  plaintiffs were defeated. The Trujillo  parties 
lost on their claims under the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) (CC 
§§1785.1–1785.36) because they had filled out false pplications and were held to have suffered 
no damages—the point I will spend most of this column discussing. In Ortiz, the defendant, an 
apartment management group, lost because its attempt o obtain certification as a class came too 
late, procedurally, and the plaintiff/tenant lost because the Investigative Consumer Reporting 
Agencies Act (ICRAA) (CC §§1786–1786.60) was held to be unconstitutionally vague in 
distinguishing between character information and creditworthiness information. 
Much of the loss in these cases can be blamed on blunders by the plaintiffs: They presented a 
class of apartment seekers whose rental applications had been allegedly rejected based on 
incorrectly reported previous unlawful detainer actions. However, in Trujillo , one had misstated 
the number of previous bankruptcies he had filed; another had falsely represented that he had 
never been subject to an unlawful detainer action; a d the third was shown to have had 
independently bad credit. Obviously, sooner or later, competent counsel will be able to find 
better-suited tenant representatives to overcome these trivial hurdles. 
Likewise, the constitutionally infirm gap between the two statutes that controlled Ortiz—since 
it was created by inadvertence in the first place—will surely be corrected by ameliorative 
legislation in the near future. The problem is not s  much, however, of forcing the legislature to 
take a stand as to which act best applies to unlawfu  detainer reports (because it is obvious that 
landlords want both creditworthiness and character information about their applicants): It is as 
important to them to know whether a prospective tenant ruined his neighbor’s peace and comfort 
by playing the saxophone all night or dealing drugs in the apartment as it is to know whether he 
was always late with the rent. Given these needs, we may well end up with a new statute: a 
CC&CRAA (Consumer Credit and Character Reporting Agency Act) that bridges the chasm 
between our present statutes. Indeed, it may be decided that unlawful detainers are so unique that 
a freestanding “UDRAA” should exist on its own. 
But those are the easy fixes. The heart of the problem—and the barrier that tenants may find 
insurmountable—is that the cases were lost because the courts held that the plaintiffs suffered no 
damage from the incomplete tenant screening reports tha  their applications generated, based on 
the evidence presented by the defendants. 
Basically, the defendants won Trujillo  because the property managers—who were the ones 
who had ordered the reports—”asserted they would have rejected the applications even if the 
tenant screening reports had accurately indicated the unlawful detainer actions had been 
dismissed ... or the resulting judgment had been satisfied.” 157 CA4th at 634. If the tenants 
would have been turned down even with more reliable reports, they were ipso facto not harmed 
by reports that were unreliable. 
Now, that was a very clever strategy. The CCRAA in fact prohibits a credit reporting agency 
from reporting unlawful detainers “unless the lessor was the prevailing party,” defined as one 
who got a judgment, a summary judgment, or a settlement that provided for its reporting. CC 
§1785.13(b)(3). (A similar provision appears in theICRAA; see CC §1786(a)(4).) That meant, of 
course, that the agencies’ reports of UDs that had merely been filed—as is often the case—were 
facially in violation of the Act, and the class action lawyers could have had a field day if that was 
all there was to it. 
It was the property managers who saved the skins of the credit agencies by averring that 
incomplete information was all they wanted in the first place (abetted in this stratagem by the 
landlords who gave the property managers written policy instructions to do exactly the kind of 
incomplete job that they were doing). That kind of back-up defense took the screening agencies 
off the hook—their incomplete reports may have violated the statute, but they caused no harm, 
since their customers did not want the whole story  begin with. 
At first, I wondered why the landlords and property managers were acting so heroically about 
rescuing the screening agencies. But as I thought about it, I began to realize that there was 
probably no personal cost involved in that heroism. What exactly is there in California 
jurisprudence that deters a landlord from saying that s e does not want to consider a tenant who 
was previously subject to an unlawful detainer action? Our Fair Housing Act prohibits 
discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national 
origin, ancestry, familial status, source of income, or disability” (Govt C §12955(a))—but none 
of those categories appears to include litigiousnes. Landlords may be barred from retaliating 
against troublemaking tenants (see CC §1942.5), but they do not have to let them in as tenants in 
the first place if they think they are troublemakers. 
The Unruh Civil Rights Act (CC §51), which has a slightly different list of protected classes 
than the Fair Housing Act (adds medical condition and drops source of income as a category), is 
sometimes said to generally prohibit arbitrariness of any kind. But I do not think that it compels a 
landlord to rent to a tenant previously named in an unlawful detainer action. Income 
requirements have survived Unruh Act challenges (Harris v Capital Growth Investors XIV 
(1991) 278 CR 614, 52 C3d 1142), and not having been evicted looks pretty similar to not being 
poor. 
The thrust of the plaintiffs’ challenges in these actions was not that their clients had been 
wrongly evicted previously, but that the reports failed to show that the disclosed eviction actions 
had not been successful. Is it arbitrary, then, under the Unruh Act to turn down tenants without 
knowing that ultimate fact? A 2007 Yale Law Journal article (yes, we law professors have to 
read those things) quotes one screener as saying “[i]t is the policy of 99 percent of our [landlord] 
customers in New York to flat out reject anybody with a landlord tenant record, no matter what 
the reason is and no matter what the outcome is, becaus  if their dispute has escalated to court, 
an owner will view them as a pain.” Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening 30 Years Later: A Statutory 
Proposal To Protect Public Records, 116 Yale LJ 1344, 1347 (Apr. 2007). That must be equally 
true in California, at least in our crowded urban markets. If taking that position is the custom and 
practice of most landlords, are our judges likely to find it irrational or arbitrary? 
In light of how these cases were successfully defensed, it will not be easy for the legislature to 
solve this problem with new legislation, even if it is sympathetic to the tenants. It cannot require 
the screening agencies to report more fully, since that is already required of them but has been 
rendered superfluous by landlords’ indifference to the missing information. Can it require the 
landlords to insist on information they do not want? Can it insist that they then read it? Finally, 
can it insist that these landlords act differently because of the rest of the information? 
Currently, there are some restrictions on what kind of “adverse actions” (defined in CC 
§1785.3(a)) a purchaser of a screening report can take, but none relates to accepting a tenant’s 
application for a rental unit. Perhaps the definitio  of adverse action could be broadened to 
include tenant rejection, but how could that operate in crowded rental markets where there are 
multiple applications for each available unit? Would a landlord be compelled to select the 
application of a previously unlawfully detained tenant over that of some other tenant, because, 
e.g., it was submitted first? Would a just cause rejection letter have to be sent to each 
unsuccessful applicant, explaining that his previous UD history was not the real reason for 
preferring another applicant over him? Would an administrative hearing follow? 
As for class actions, they could be made more succesful if the credit reporting acts substituted 
a statutory penalty for actual damage compensation, since that would wipe out the defense that 
worked so effectively in these cases. It would also force the screening agencies to do more. 
Whether they could do so within the confines of the $30 screening fee they are currently allowed 
to charge (CC §1950.6(b)) is a wholly different question that I do not have to answer. 
 
Ortiz v Lyon Mgmt. Group, Inc. (2007) 157 CA4th 604, 69 CR3d 66 
Ortiz applied to rent an apartment managed by Lyon Management Group (Lyon) and gave 
Lyon written consent to obtain a tenant screening repo t, including an unlawful detainer search. 
The report indicated that no unlawful detainer actions had been filed against Ortiz, who moved 
into one of Lyon’s apartments. 
Ortiz, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, sued Lyon for 
violating the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agenci s Act (ICRAA) (CC §§1786–1786.56), 
alleging that Lyon failed to give her written notice and a report requesting form, as required by 
CC §1786.16(a)(3), (b)(1). The trial court granted Lyon’s motion for summary judgment, finding 
that the tenant screening report contained no charater information subject to the ICRAA. 
Thereafter, Lyon moved for class certification, which the court denied. 
The court of appeal affirmed. Ortiz contended that er tenant screening report contained 
character information because it indicated whether any unlawful detainer actions had been filed 
against her. On an issue of first impression, the court held that the ICRAA is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to tenant screening reports containi g unlawful detainer information because 
reasonable persons cannot readily determine whether unlawful detainer information constitutes 
character information governed by the ICRAA or creditworthiness information governed by the 
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) (CC §§1785.1–1785.36). 
The statutory scheme, consisting of two distinct statutes governing two kinds of tenant 
screening reports depending on the type of information they contain, indicates a legislative intent 
to distinguish between creditworthiness information and character information. Nothing in the 
statutes suggests that any one item of information may constitute both creditworthiness and 
character information, subjecting a tenant screening report to both statutes; a single item of 
information may be classified as either creditworthiness or character information, but not both. 
The legislature demanded that the two types of information be distinguished when classifying 
tenant screening reports as subject either to the CCRAA or the ICRAA. 
At the same time, the legislature recognized the inherent overlap between creditworthiness 
information and character information. Each statute expressly excludes from its ambit any 
reports containing only information covered by the other. Those exclusions show that, in their 
absence, the information covered by the other statute would also be covered by it. 
Although the statutory scheme makes it relatively simple to categorize a traditional credit 
report as subject to the CCRAA, not the ICRAA, unlawful detainer information can be 
categorized under both statutes because it pertains o both creditworthiness and character. 
Unlawful detainer information most commonly reveals llegations concerning the untimely 
payment of rent; timely payment of obligations relat s to creditworthiness. Unlawful detainer 
actions may also be based on holding over after lease expiration, breach of a lease covenant, 
commission of waste, or maintenance of a nuisance—ats that may suggest character traits. 
Adding to the confusion, good counter arguments can be made to these classifications: Renting 
an apartment is not truly a credit transaction, because a landlord neither sells property on time 
nor makes funds available to tenants, and breach of ontract is an act to which the law ordinarily 
assigns no moral blameworthiness. 
Thus, there is no rational basis on which a person of ordinary intelligence can determine 
whether unlawful detainer information constitutes creditworthiness information subject to the 
CCRAA or character information subject to the ICRAA. Credit reporting agencies and landlords 
must necessarily guess at the ICRAA’s meaning and differ as to its application. The ICRAA thus 
fails to provide adequate notice to persons who compile or request tenant screening reports that 
contain unlawful detainer information and is unconstitutional as applied to such reports. 
The court also held that the trial court correctly denied class certification because Lyon had 
already obtained adjudication of the merits of Ortiz’s individual claim. Postmerits certification 
requires a showing of changed circumstances and a compelling justification (Fireside Bank v 
Superior Court (2007) 40 C4th 1069, 56 CR3d 861), which were absent h re. 
Trujillo v First Am. Registry, Inc. (2007) 157 CA4th 628, 68 CR3d 732 
Tenants sued First American Registry, alleging thatit had prepared tenant screening reports 
that correctly showed unlawful detainer actions hadbeen filed against them, but wrongly failed 
to note the actions had been dismissed or the resulting judgment had been satisfied, and that 
these incomplete reports had caused property managers to reject their rental applications. They 
claimed violations of the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) (CC §§1785.1–
1785.36), the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus & PC §§17200–17210), and the 
Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA) (CC §§1786–1786.60). The trial court 
granted defendant summary adjudication on each of te causes of action, finding that plaintiffs 
had not suffered damage or injury from the alleged statutory violations. 
The court of appeal affirmed. Plaintiffs alleged defendant violated the CCRAA’s requirement 
to follow reasonable procedures ensuring accurate credit reports (CC §1785.14(b)) because their 
tenant screening reports failed to reflect that their unlawful detainer actions had been dismissed. 
However, plaintiffs failed to show that they suffered damages as a result of the violation, as 
required by CC §1785.31(a). The undisputed evidence showed that the property managers would 
have rejected plaintiffs’ applications even if the tenant screening reports showed the unlawful 
detainer actions had been dismissed. The CCRAA claim f iled as a matter of law because 
plaintiffs suffered no actual damage. 
Actual damage, not “inherent harm” as plaintiffs contended, is required to state a CCRAA 
claim. Nor were plaintiffs excused from proving actual damage because they sought injunctive 
relief or punitive damages. Injunctive relief under CC §1785.31(b) is expressly limited to 
consumers who have been “aggrieved,” i.e., consumers who have been actually injured. Actual 
damage is a prerequisite to recovering punitive damages. 
Similarly, plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue as to whether they suffered injury in fact or 
lost money or property as a result of unfair competition, as required for standing to assert a UCL 
claim. Bus & P C §17204; Californians for Disability Rights v Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 C4th 
223, 228, 46 CR3d 57. 
The ICRAA claim failed because the ICRAA is unconstitutionally vague as applied to tenant 
screening reports containing unlawful detainer information. It governs reports containing 
“information on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of 
living.” CC §1786.2(c). Plaintiffs asserted their tenant screening reports were subject to the 
ICRAA because the reports indicated unlawful detainer actions had been filed against them and 
thus contained “character information.” In a companion case, the court of appeal held that the 
ICRAA is unconstitutionally vague because persons of reasonable intelligence cannot determine 
whether unlawful detainer information is character information subject to the ICRAA or 
creditworthiness information subject to the CCRAA. Ortiz v Lyon Mgmt. Group, Inc. (2007) 157 
CA4th 604, 69 CR3d 66. 
 
